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Payoff information hampers the evolution of
cooperation
Steffen Huck1,2, Johannes Leutgeb1 & Ryan Oprea3
Human cooperation has been explained through rationality as well as heuristics-based
models. Both model classes share the feature that knowledge of payoff functions is weakly
beneﬁcial for the emergence of cooperation. Here, we present experimental evidence to the
contrary. We let human subjects interact in a competitive environment and ﬁnd that, in
the long run, access to information about own payoffs leads to less cooperative behaviour. In
the short run subjects use naive learning heuristics that get replaced by better adapted
heuristics in the long run. With more payoff information subjects are less likely to switch to
pro-cooperative heuristics. The results call for the development of two-tier models for the
evolution of cooperation.
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rasping the forces and conditions that foster cooperative
behaviour is of central importance for the understanding
of how societies thrive or decline. Cooperation has been
explained through models with purely selﬁsh agents who exhibit
high levels of sophistication and reasoning in repeated-game
environments1,2; static models invoking social preferences,
altruistic punishments and reciprocity3–11; evolutionary models
that show under which conditions cooperative behaviour,
reciprocity and pro-social preferences survive12–16; and models
showing how learning rules and heuristics such as win–stay,
lose–shift or win–continue and lose–reverse can generate
cooperative behaviour17–20. All these models either depend on
the assumption that agents have full knowledge of their own
‘payoff function’ (that is, that they know how all possible
outcomes in the game they play map into success), or, where such
knowledge is not required, imply that having access to payoff
information cannot hurt.
Here we present evidence to the contrary: we show that in the
long run, learning environment payoff information hampers the
evolution of cooperation. Our evidence suggests that, for
understanding behaviour in the long run, two-tier models
combining elements of evolutionary models and models of
learning rules and heuristics are appropriate. In the short run, we
ﬁnd that subjects’ behaviour is best described by naive learning
heuristics but in the long run these heuristics are replaced by
better adapted heuristics. We show that subjects are much less
likely to learn to adopt heuristics that foster cooperation if they
have access to payoff information.
Results
The experiment. We study learning behaviour in a game with
600 periods that each last 8 s. (We also have data on games with
1,200 4-s and 2,400 2-s periods that generate similar results.
See Supplementary Figs 1 and 2 as well as Supplementary
Discussion.) The game is a two-player contest game with a
continuous action space that exhibits a strong tension between
competition and cooperation. The payoff function is
pi xi; x ið Þ ¼ 10þ 120P
j
xj
 10
 
xi where xi denotes the action of
agent i; maximum competition implies xi¼ 6 with proﬁts of 0.5
euro cents per period, maximum cooperation xi¼ 0.1 with proﬁts
of 3.45 cents per period and Nash in between at xi¼ 3 and proﬁts
of 2 cents per period. Points are converted into Euro by dividing
them by 2,000. The one-period Nash equilibrium outcome is in
the middle of the action space with an effort of 3 and proﬁts of 2
cents. There are two treatments, Info and NoInfo, varying the
feedback information that subjects receive between rounds. In
both treatments, subjects observe the action proﬁle of the last
period and the resulting payoffs for themselves and their partner.
In treatment Info they additionally observe a curve showing the
possible payoffs they would have earned in the previous period
for alternative choices. Note that the NoInfo treatment is based
on previous work by Friedman et al.21 that use the same software
package albeit slightly different parameters with 4 s per period
and rematching of subjects every 400 periods. Our ﬁndings
successfully replicate their ﬁndings.
Running this many periods of interaction in a single laboratory
session is made feasible using a graphical software interface
(see Fig. 1) where choices are implemented through a slider.
Actions are determined by the slider’s position at the end of the
timed period and the slider remains in the same position when
the next period starts. Subjects are shown a progress bar ﬁlling up
every 8 s and a counter of remaining periods. In the ﬁrst period
sliders are set at a random position that determines play in that
period. After a period has ended subjects receive feedback on both
players’ actions and payoffs in the previous period: two dots in
the interface indicate (through their horizontal position) actions
and (through their vertical position) payoffs. Furthermore,
in treatment Info subjects are shown a curve of potential
payoffs that they could have earned given their partner’s choice.
Notice that subjects are, of course, free to leave the slider in the
same position for multiple rounds, in which case actions from
previous periods are simply repeated. Indeed, many subjects often
choose to wait a little between adjustments, which renders the
game much less volatile and stressful than the sheer number of
periods might suggest.
Aggregate results. Figure 2 shows median actions over the course
of the experiment. The experimental results can be divided into
three phases: ﬁrst, a phase in which subjects employ naive
heuristics shaped by salient feedback information; second, a
learning phase in which subjects revise their initial naive
heuristics; and, third, a long-run phase where behaviour settles
down. In what follows we separate the phases at period 25 and
period 300. All results are robust to changing the separating
periods by ±20%.
Information provided has a strong inﬂuence on which naive
heuristics subjects initially choose. In the naive NoInfo heuristics
phase, subjects choose actions above the Nash prediction—the
often-observed consequences of imitate-the-best heuristics that
subjects frequently employ in low-information settings in
previous experiments21–24. In contrast, during the same initial
naive phase, subjects in the Info treatment rapidly converge on
the static Nash equilibrium outcome. This behaviour is consistent
with a myopic best-reply heuristic, also documented in previous
studies in which payoff information was available21–26. The
difference between the two treatments is signiﬁcant (two-sided
Mann–Whitney U-test, Po0.05).
After 25 periods, subjects in NoInfo dramatically decrease their
actions, indicating that they successfully abandon the imitation
heuristic. Subjects in Info exhibit a much weaker downward
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Figure 1 | Interface in the Info treatment. The subject chooses her action
on the horizontal axis via a slider. The green and red dots represent a
subject’s, respectively his or her partner’s, earnings in the preceding period.
The black line shows the potential payoffs in the preceding period. On the
top of the interface, the subjects see the number of remaining periods, the
amount of points they earned and how much time they have left to decide
via a progress bar. The interface in NoInfo is exactly the same except for the
black curve of potential payoffs. Note that, in the experiment, the x axis is
intentionally left unlabelled to avoid giving the subjects any cues on how to
behave. The y axis shows the payoffs in points.
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pattern, suggesting that they have a harder time abandoning the
myopic best-reply heuristic. From period 300 on, behaviour
stabilizes in the long-run phase. In NoInfo subjects choose actions
that are signiﬁcantly more cooperative than the Nash outcome
(two-sided t-test, Po0.001), whereas in Info their average action
is indistinguishable from the Nash outcome (two-sided t-test,
P40.1). Crucially, subjects cooperate much more successfully in
treatment NoInfo than in Info (two-sided Mann–Whitney U-test,
Po0.001), generating also signiﬁcantly higher payoffs in the
long-run phase. In the ﬁnal phase median earnings are 6.01 Euro
in Info, whereas in NoInfo they are over 50% higher at 9.56 Euro.
Note that this pattern is replicated in the treatments with 1,200
and 2,400 periods, although subjects in the Info treatments show
slightly more collusive behaviour. See Supplementary Figs 1 and 2
as well as the Supplementary Discussion.
Individual behaviour. What individual behavioural patterns give
rise to the differences in aggregate behaviour documented above?
To ﬁnd out, we run simple regressions to investigate whether the
changes that we observe are consistent with a set of heuristics
relevant in our setting. Speciﬁcally, we examine ‘Imitate-the-Best’,
which tells a subject to copy the opponent’s action in the previous
period if the opponent chose a higher action and made higher
proﬁts; ‘Match’, which tells a subject to copy the other player’s
action regardless of payoff; ‘Win-Continue, Lose-Reverse’
(WCLR) where a subject repeats the previous round’s adjustment
if it improved his or her payoff and changes directions if proﬁts
declined; and, ﬁnally, ‘Myopic Best Reply’, which tells subjects to
move towards the best reply against their opponent’s current
action. While imitate-the-best pushes behaviour towards extre-
mely competitive outcomes (a higher action always generates a
higher relative payoff)27 and myopic best replies push behaviour
towards Nash28, both, the Match heuristic and WCLR, are
heuristics that foster cooperation. As with tit-for-tat, Match
rewards an opponent’s move towards cooperative play and
punishes deviations to higher actions. Moreover, Match aligns
subjects’ actions thereby speeding up WCLR as an effective force
for pushing actions towards cooperation13,19,20. Obviously,
Myopic Best Reply is easily available for subjects in the Info
treatment, whereas it requires information acquisition and much
more sophistication in the NoInfo treatment.
Some of these heuristics give point predictions whereas others
yield predictions about the direction of change. To make
comparable comparisons, we focus only on changes in decisions
relative to the subject’s previous period action. The outcome
variable CHANGE gives the direction of change. Independent
variables COPY UP and COPY DOWN capture the Imitate-the-
Best and Match heuristics. Finally, WCLR is captured by the
variable of the same name and Myopic Best Reply is captured by
variable BR. The treatment effects are captured by treatment
dummy INFO. We also interact treatment dummy INFO with all
of the heuristics variables described above to pick up the
differences in subjects’ use of the modelled heuristics. The exact
variable deﬁnitions are reported in the Methods section.
Table 1 reports the results of the model estimated separately on
the naive, and then the learning and long-run phases combined.
The ﬁrst column reports estimates for the naive phase, that is, the
ﬁrst 25 periods. The coefﬁcient COPY UP is signiﬁcant and large,
whereas COPY DOWN is insigniﬁcant. This indicates strong
imitate-the-best behaviour in NoInfo. In Info, on the other hand,
there is no evidence of imitate-the-best behaviour. The interac-
tion term COPY UP:INFO is negative and weakly signiﬁcant and
cancels out the baseline effect entirely (Wald test P40.1). In
NoInfo the BR coefﬁcient picks up some regression to the mean,
while the large and highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the
interaction term BR:INFO indicates just how appealing subjects
ﬁnd the best-reply heuristic once they have the relevant
information. Finally, there is some weakly signiﬁcant evidence
for WCLR already in the ﬁrst phase. Some subjects may already
switch from imitation to WCLR at the end of the initial phase.
Column 2 reports estimates for the learning and the long-run
phases (periods 25 to 600). In NoInfo, COPY UP remains
signiﬁcant while COPY DOWN now also turns signiﬁcant and
negative. There is therefore a switch from Imitate-the-best to the
Matching heuristic. The estimations also show that WCLR
becomes a key heuristic in NoInfo. This behaviour gives rise to
the decrease in actions in the learning phase and stabilizes
cooperative play in the long-run. The interaction term
WCLR:INFO is negative if insigniﬁcant, and the linear
combination of baseline and interaction term is insigniﬁcant
Table 1 | Linear probability model estimates.
Dependent variable
CHANGE
(1) Periods 1–25 (2) Periods 26–600
COPY UP 0.422***(0.144) 0.274*** (0.077)
COPY DOWN 0.015 (0.172) 0.221** (0.082)
WCLR 0.062* (0.031) 0.108** (0.049)
BR 0.114*** (0.037) 0.087* (0.047)
INFO 0.355* (0.186) 0.196* (0.109)
COPY UP:INFO 0.518*** (0.168) 0.124 (0.106)
COPY DOWN:INFO 0.362* (0.196) 0.285** (0.109)
WCLR:INFO 0.006 (0.053) 0.065 (0.057)
BR:INFO 0.226*** (0.066) 0.111* (0.062)
Constant 0.264 (0.161) 0.347*** (0.082)
Observations 1,428 26,216
R2 0.233 0.250
F-statistic 47.91*** 81.48***
We report a linear probability model estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) as the
interpretation of the coefﬁcients, especially of the interaction terms, is most straightforward. The
results of a Logit estimation are qualitatively similar. To check robustness we also run
regressions where we drop observations on the limit of the action space as subjects can then
only increase respectively decrease their action. The results remain qualitatively robust. Variable
deﬁnitions are reported in the Methods section. Note that interaction terms are denoted by a
colon. In this regression we pool data from learning and long-run phases as results do not
change qualitatively between them. Supplementary Table 1 reports separate regressions for
learning and long-run phases.
*Po0.1, **Po0.05, ***Po0.01; s.e. clustered on groups in parentheses.
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Figure 2 | Median actions. Up to period 25, each dot represents the
median action in bins of 5 periods. From period 25 (dashed vertical line), on
each dot represents the median action in bins of 25 periods. In the naive
phase (periods 1–25), the average action (s.d. in parentheses) is 3.65 (1.58)
in NoInfo and 3.37 (1.19) in Info. In the learning phase (periods 26–300),
this changes to 2.22 (1.90) in NoInfo and 2.93 (1.65) in Info. Finally, in the
long-run phase (periods 301–600), behaviour settles down at 1.23 (1.45) in
NoInfo and 2.62 (1.80) in Info.
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(Wald test P40.1). Thus, there is no evidence of subjects
following WCLR in the Info treatment. Instead, the interaction
effect BR:INFO is weakly signiﬁcant and when combined with the
baseline is highly signiﬁcant (Wald test Po0.01), indicating that
subjects continue strongly to follow the Myopic Best Reply
heuristic. These results thus show that subjects ﬁnd it much
harder to abandon their initially chosen heuristic in Info.
Discussion
Payoff information can hurt because it can affect the initial
heuristics that subjects become attached to as well as subjects’
long-run afﬁnity to that heuristic. This is in stark contrast to
rational models of cooperation. The results strongly suggest that
subjects lean heavily on heuristics instead of employing more
sophisticated repeated-game logic to achieve cooperation in early
play as much as in the long run. Most importantly, dropping
superﬁcially plausible heuristics like myopic best reply
(which maximizes short-run payoffs) turns out to be much
harder than dropping a more obviously ill-adapted heuristic like
imitate-the-best (that generates much lower payoffs by inducing
extreme competition). As a result, payoff information is an
advantage only in the short run, hampering the learning
necessary to establish cooperation in the long run. Modelling
such long-run evolution of cooperation requires a two-tier model
where subjects follow heuristics for a while but adapt or replace
them over time. Fully accounting for such long-run cooperative
evolutionary processes requires models that describe not only the
heuristics employed by agents in an interaction but also how and
when agents learn to improve these heuristics over time.
Finally, some thoughts on external validity are in order. In our
laboratory setting feedback on others’ actions and proﬁts and
feedback on possible payoffs that could have been achieved are
extremely salient and there are no information channels that
would connect individuals to others outside their immediate
group of competitors. We would, of course, expect that learning
reacts to changes in the environment such as readily available
multi-period memory, information from other groups of players
or endogenous choice of partners and evolutionary selection.
Indeed, incorporating such richer information and social
structures provides many interesting possibilities for future
research. However, we believe that when it comes to the external
validity of our main result we can argue that our Info treatment
provides an ideal setting for payoff information to aid subjects’
rationality. There is very little distraction and experimentation to
learn more about the payoff landscape remains, thanks to the
large number of repetitions, extremely cheap. If human
cooperation were largely driven by rational calculation, our Info
treatment should clearly have speeded up cooperation and should
have increased subjects’ earnings throughout the experiment. We
ﬁnd evidence to the contrary despite the ideal conditions
provided in the laboratory.
Methods
Experimental setup. The experiment was run employing the ConG software
package29. In each of the two treatments we observe 18 independent anonymous
pairs of subjects who play the game for 600 periods. Subjects were recruited via
ORSEE30 at the WZB-TU laboratory in Berlin. Sessions lasted 80min and subjects’
average payouts were 12.63 Euro in Info and 15.66 Euro in NoInfo, plus a 5 Euro
show-up fee. Upon arrival subjects were randomly allocated to seats and received
written instructions explaining (1) they would play against one other participant;
(2) how they would choose from their action spaces; and (3) what feedback they
would receive through the graphical interface. Subjects are not made aware of the
payoff function. They only know that the payoff function depends exclusively on
both players’ choices and that it is symmetric and does not change over time. The
experimental instructions are reported in the Supplementary Methods.
Variable deﬁnitions. We deﬁne the variables in the regression in Table 1 as
follows. The outcome variable CHANGE is coded as 1 for an increase and 0 for a
decrease in action. Imitate-the-best is captured by the COPY UP dummy that is
coded as 1 if the opponent chose a higher action in the previous period. The match
heuristic is covered by both COPY UP and COPY DOWN (that is coded as 1 if the
opponent had a lower action). WCLR is captured by the dummy of the same name
that is coded as 1 if the heuristic prescribes an increase and 0 otherwise. For
constant proﬁts, we code the variable as 1. The results are robust to coding it as 0 or
dropping these observations. Finally, myopic best-replies are covered by the BR
dummy that is coded as 1 when the myopic best reply was above a subject’s
previous period action and 0 otherwise. There are no observations for which the
myopic best-reply would be exactly zero. Finally, we have a treatment dummy
INFO that is 1 for the Info treatment and 0 for NoInfo.
Code availability. The computer code used in the analysis is available from the
corresponding author on request.
Data availability. The data that support the ﬁndings of this study are available
from the corresponding author on request.
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